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SUMMARY ANALYSIS AND COMMENT
Preparation of this reply has been difficult because the respondent/assessor continues to
refuse to engage on the issues raised by taxpayer. Appellant/taxpayers focus, as they have
throughout, on the failure of the assessor to produce any competent evidence relating to fair
market value. Taxpayers presented substantial evidence of fair market value and citation to
recognized appraisal authority showing the assessor's methods did not comply with those
standards. The assessor never addressed those arguments. They didn't even argue that taxpayers
misstated or misinterpreted those appraisal standards. They simply ignored taxpayers' case and
presented their "that's the way we do it" defense and attempted to characterize taxpayers'
argument that there was no competent evidence as an argument that the court improperly
weighed the evidence.
In this section of the reply brief taxpayers will make the simple common sense, hornbook
legal argument in an effort to put this appeal in perspective. The following sections will contain
the legal authorities and references to the record needed in a traditional reply brief.
The issue before the County Commissioners, the Board of Tax Appeals and the District
Court was fair market value of the non buildable waterfront lot. Only a comparable sales analysis
was appropriate. Taxpayers used comparable sales from Spirit Lake, including one older sale the
going back in time method. The assessor used sales from three other lakes in the county- the
going out geographically approach. Both methods are approved by appraisal authorities in
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appropriate circumstances, but the going back in time approach is preferred according to
unrefuted evidence in the record.
If this were the end of the analysis, it would appear to be a weighing of evidence issue to
be resolved in favor of the assessor. That is not this case however. The unchallenged evidence
from a text cited by both the Board of Tax Appeals and taxpayers requires that location
adjustments be made if going out geographically. This makes sense because comparisons must
be oflike items. Numerous exhibits, none challenged by the assessor, showed that the various
markets differed in many respects, including the ratio of non buildable to buildable waterfront.
The assessor argued and the court apparently found that the assessors used an approved method
and that was all the law required. What neither the court nor the assessor addressed is the fact
that a method must not only be approved, it must be properly applied to be valid. Undisputed
evidence was that the assessor did not apply required location adjustments when the markets
were very different. Therefore, no reasonable trier of fact could find the assessor followed
generally accepted appraisal practices and taxpayers are entitled to reversal and entry of
judgment in their favor.

A.(l) Kimbrough v. Idaho Board of Tax Appeals, 150 Idaho 417,247 P.3d644 (2011), is
good law and does not need to be overruled. The portions relied upon by the trial court and
respondent do not apply to this case.
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At pages 6 and 7 of respondent's brief Judge Kerrick is commended for following the
direction of the Idaho Supreme Court in the Kimbrough case and it is suggested that I.C. § 63511 may have a different standard than that case. Both Judge Kerrick and respondent don't
understand either the Kimbrough case or Appellants' argument.
In the last sentence on page 6 of Respondent's brief the claim is made that "Judge
Kerrick was bound by the edicts of stare decisis to follow ... the Kimbrough case .... " Taxpayers
do not question stare decisis, only its application to Kimbrough here. Any discussion of stare
decisis in this case should start with Merris v.Ada County, 100 Idaho 59, 539 P.2d 394 (1979)
and its holding that an assessor's valuation , even if arrived at using methods approved by the
State Tax Commission, must be set aside if it does not reflect fair market value
Appellants do not want the law changed or Kimbrough overruled. They simply want it applied
properly in this case. As explained in Appellants' brief (Argument in Support of Assignment of
Error I, pp.S-1 0) the "manifestly excessive, fraudulent or oppressive; or arbitrary capricious and
resulting in discrimination against the taxpayer" language establishes a standard for judicial
review of district court decisions by appellate courts. It has no application to the burden of proof
at trial in the district court. That burden of proof is established by I. C. §63-511 and §63-3812 as
a simple preponderance of the evidence.
The heightened Kimbrough standard does not apply to trials in district court and its application
here was clearly erroneous.
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A.(2) In light of the trial court's improper use of the enhanced Kimbrough standard, it is

impossible to determine whether the trial court found that taxpayers also failed to meet the
I.C. §63-511 and §63-3812 burden.

Respondent argues that the trial court "also found that Petitioner did not shoulder his
burden under Idaho Code§ 63-511." (Resp.Briefp. 6, end of first complete paragraph) The very
next paragraph of their brief shows the fatal flaw in their position. It quotes footnote 6 of judge
Kerrick's opinion showing that he used the preponderance test to determine whether taxpayers
met the enhanced Kimbrough standard. There are no clearly stated findings showing what
standard was used. It is therefore not possible to call this harmless error. The improper use of the
enhanced Kimbrough standard infected the entire process and reversal is required.
IRCP 52 A requires the trial court "find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions oflaw thereon." Many of the trial court's 15 so called findings of fact are mere
recitations of testimony offered. In many cases the testimony was disputed or contested, but the
court never indicates which facts it found persuasive or how it resolved the factual disputes ..
The assessor's brief at page 6 refers to footnote 6 of the judge's decision requiring the
taxpayers to prove by a preponderance that the assessor's action were manifestly excessive
fraudulent etc. The judge clearly used that improper standard and his findings and conclusions
are not specific enough to determine whether he ever applied the simple preponderance standard
the law requires.
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The trial Judge's amended findings and conclusions (first paragraph, p. 12, Am.R., p.359)
simply misstate the record when addressing taxpayers contention that only Spirit Lake
comparables should be relied upon, he concludes: "however, nothing in the record indicates that
the assessor is limited in such a fashion for purposes of applying the sales comparison approach."
The record however contains the affidavit of Tony Higley (Pet. Ex.l3) explaining that the
lakes are so different that only Spirit Lake sales are appropriate. The record also contains
portions of the text Appraising the Tough Ones explaining that location adjustments are required
when going out geographically (App. Ex. 7-6) and that going back in time is a method preferred
to going out geographically. (App. Brief, P. 24;Pet. Ex.7-4,4th paragraph) The record also
contains substantial evidence discussed in the Argument in support of Assignment of Error VII.
of Appellants' brief demonstrating that the lakes are very different and that the buildable to non
buildable ratios vary greatly.
Judge Kerrick didn't make special findings on disputed facts. He didn't recognize that
taxpayers had presented substantial evidence of a flawed application of the sales comparison
approach. He held Kimbrough created a presumption that the assessor's valuation is correct.(Am.
Find p.ll middle ofpage, Am. R. p.358) His findings and conclusions are not supported by the
record or the law and must be set aside

B.

The harmless error analysis is not applicable when the error results in an order

which is contrary to law.
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The harmless error test is applied when an error exists which does not change the result
of a case. Mistakes of fact or law, improper admission or denial of evidence, or improper jury
instructions which do not necessitate a change of a verdict, judgment or order are common
examples. An error which results in an improper order is a different matter. The concern all
lawyers and courts should have for the proper administration of justice require that orders be
accurate and in proper form.
This Court discussed the harmless error rule as applied in criminal cases in State v.
Perry, I 50 Idaho209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010). In that decision this Court cited with apparent

approval US. v. Olano, 507 U.S.725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed2d, 508 (1993) to the effect that
an appellate court "should still only reverse where the error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Any order which is plainly erroneous,
whether because of clerical mistake or misapplication of law, does affect the integrity and public
reputation of judicial proceedings and must not be allowed to stand.

C. (a.) The application ofi.C. § 63-3813 was not appropriate.
Respondent's brief argues in the first part of section Cat page 8 that the application of
the statute was appropriate but never cites authority or does any analysis to support the argument.
Respondent ignores Appellants' brief Argument in support of assignment error III (p.ll) which
clearly shows the statute inapplicable because the only Board of Tax Appeals decision at issue
was appealed to the district court within the prescribed time.
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Respondent then goes on to explain why the statute is not applicable. In the last
paragraph of page 8 of the brief, Respondent highlights the word "increase". Respondent here
raises a point completely overlooked by appellant. The statute applies only to increases. There
was no increase here. Both sides have set forth valid reasons that the statute does not apply.
(b.)Taxpayers have not waived the right to object to the improper application ofi.C.

§ 63-3813.
Respondent argues that the application of the statute was briefed and argued below. The
only mention of the statute is in the final sentence of the Petitioners Response brief, which
concludes "and order that the value remain at that value for the subsequent year in accordance
with I.C. §63-3813."(Augmented record p. 13)
Appellants question whether this passing mention is briefing and arguing the issue, but it
is true that it was never addressed below by them. They may be precluded from objecting to any
order "in accordance with I.C. 63-3813" but this is not such an order. It sets a fixed dollar value
and ignores the statutory proviso that annual trendings shall still apply.
Respondent cites Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho128, (1867) in explaining why a party should
not be allowed to "slumber" then complain to the appellate court. This makes perfect sense in
most cases, but not here. The assessor urged the application ofi.C. §63-3813 and taxpayers
remained silent. What was proposed however was entry of an order "in accordance with I.C.§633813." There was no reason to expect that the Judge would enter an order which ignored the
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proviso on annual trendings. Parties cannot assume the judge will misapply the law. The judge
did not enter an order in accordance with the law and the error was apparent only after the order
was entered. This is the proper court in which to raise that issue.
(c.) The harmless error test is not appropriate in cases where a party is in direct
violation of a court order.
Respondent's argument that taxpayers were not harmed by any of the judge's errors is
true if the assessor's 50% ratio is upheld, but only because the assessor ignored the court's orders
and used the proper values in its assessment notices. That is the problem here.
In United States v. United Mineworkers ofAmerica,330 U.S. 258 (294),67 S. CT.677, 91
L Ed. 884, (194 7) the court stated :
"we find impressive authority for the proposition that an order issued by a
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the
parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings."
That language was cited with approval by this court in In the matter ofJohn Weick, 142
Idaho 275, 127 P.3d 178 (2005)
In this case an elected official (the assessor) violates the terms of an order issued by a
court which clearly had subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Then, an elected prosecutor
supports that action. Ignoring a court order is prejudicial to the administration of justice in all
cases and should be of special concern when elected officials are involved.
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This Court rejected the "No harm, no foul "rule in cases involving the administration of
justice in Defendant A. V Idaho State Bar Association, 140Idaho800, (807) 102 P.3d 1119
(2004) The harmless error analysis is thus not applicable here.
E. (1.) Taxpayers are not asking this Court to weigh the evidence. They are asking the
court to rule on the legal sufficiency of the evidence. They have consistently argued that
market value, not value for assessment is the proper standard and that the assessor neither
presented credible evidence of market value nor rebutted or refuted taxpayers' evidence of
market value.

Section E. of Respondent's brief claims that taxpayers do not argue that Judge Kerrick's
findings were not supported by substantial evidence. That is wrong! That is exactly the argument
made in Appellants' assignment of error VIII.
Simply reading the first paragraph of the argument in support of assignment of error viii.
(pp. 27-28 of appellants' brief) makes that clear. The remaining 5 pages summarize he evidence
and establish that the assessor chose not to address the fair market value issue relying instead on
the flawed assumption that compliance with mass appraisal standards was all that was required.

Merris v. Ada County 100 Idaho 59 (63), 593 P.2d 394 (398), in the quote cited in the
last full paragraph of Appellants' brief, page 14, clearly establishes the rule that compliance with
tax commission regulations is meaningless if that compliance does not result in a valuation
which reflects fair market value. Appellant produced substantial evidence using approved fair
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market value methodology and additional evidence that the assessor's methods did not comply
with generally accepted fair market value standards. Respondent chose not to present fair market
value evidence and not to rebut Appellants' evidence. There was no fair market value evidence
in the entire record to support the Judges findings and conclusions.
E. (1) (b) Respondent's reliance on City of McCall v. Seubert is misplaced because
in this case the Assessor's methodology was flawed, not just different.

Taxpayers are not asking this Court to weigh the evidence. They are asking the Court to
set aside findings which are clearly erroneous and not supported by substantial and competent
evidence. The quote from City of McCall v. Seubert 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d 1118 (2006) found
at the bottom of page 10 of Respondent/assessor's brief is distinguishable and illustrates a very
important point. There the City did not prevail because the court found that the methodology
"was not flawed, just different." In this case the evidence is undisputed that the methodology is
flawed.
The paragraph following the language quoted above and at page 10 of Respondent's
brief states:
"A review of the trial transcript indicates there is support for [the Appraiser's]
methodologies and opinion."
Here, a review of the record indicates the methodology was flawed. Frank E. Harrison's text
Appraising the Tough Ones is a publication of The Appraisal Institute cited by the Board of

Tax Appeals in its decision below. (Am. R.,p.276) and the basis for an educational course
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attended by deputy assessor Erin Sacksteader. (Tr., p.23,L.23) A portion of that text, reprinted as
Appellants' Trial exhibit 7-6, states:
When the appraiser goes out geographically to find comparable sales in an alternative
market, a location adjustment is required."
No required adjustments were made in this case. No authority was cited or testimony presented
to explain why the mandatory adjustments were not made. Taxpayers presented exhibits and
testimony that the markets differed in many respects.(Argument in Support of Assignment of
Error VII.) The assessor made no effort to refute or rebut any of that testimony. The examination
of the record in this case, following the practice suggested by City of McCall v. Seubert, thus
shows that the methodology was flawed, clearly erroneous and not supported by substantial
evidence
E. (2.) Respondent's argument that Appellants' are trying to change the law

through judicial fiat is incorrect.
Respondent argues at pages 11 and 12 of his brief that Appellant is trying to change the
law by judicial fiat and is asking the Assessor to use methods beyond Idaho law. If that were the
case, Respondent's argument would be persuasive. That is not what Appellants have argued.
At the risk of being repetitious, Appellants will again explain what they are arguing. This
is a summary of the argument in support of assignment of error VI. Found starting at page 14 of
appellants' brief. Citations and authorities are found there and will not be repeated hers. Idaho
statute requires the Assessor to assess property in accord with rules established by the Tax
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Commission and the legislature. That assessor's valuation is "Market value for assessment
purposes." It is determined by using mass appraisal methods which recognize that limitations of
time and resources require these ad valorem practices be less stringent than those applied to
licensed appraisers, who are tasked with establishing "market value."
The entire statutory scheme for Boards of Equalization and Tax Appeals is necessary and
has been created in large part because even proper application of the approved mass appraisal
techniques may not yield accurate market value valuations. The job of the County
Commissioners sitting as a Board of Equalization is to determine market value, not whether the
assessor used proper mass appraisal techniques.
The prepared script the Board of Equalization reads at the start of each hearing reads in
part: "The decision of this Board will be based on actual market value .... " (Amended R. p. 62,
L.6) The Merris v. Ada County quote at page 14 of Appellants' brief makes it very clear that
even a value determined in accord with Tax commission regulations will be set aside if it does
not reflect fair market value.
Appellants do not argue that "the Assessor should use a different method beyond Idaho
law to determine the value of the subject property" as Respondent claims. (Resp. Brief, p.12)
The assessor must use those methods (and must use them properly), but if those methods don't
result in an accurate fair market value determination, the assessor must present fair market value
evidence after the taxpayer meets the burden of going forward.
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That is what the Assessor did not do at any point in these appeals. In spite of Appellants
repeatedly explaining the law, the Assessor presents no market value evidence and doesn't even
address Appellants' argument or the Merris case.

F. Respondent's argument concerning equitable remedies is invalid because it
attempts to apply rules from to the legal side to the courts' broader powers in equity and
ignores the established equitable maxims cited by appellants.
Respondent argues that it is 'not appropriate for this Court to be the initial finder of fact
for the 2012 tax year valuation" and that taxpayers have failed to exhaust administrative
remedies. (Resp. brief, p.12) Testimony established that the assessor works on a 5 year
revaluation cycle. (Tr.P.99,L.3) The record contains revaluation documents from 2003 (Am. R.,
P.143) and 2008. (Am. R., P.88) Thus a new revaluation will be done in 2013.Whatever ratio is
determined to be appropriate in this case for the 2010 and 20 11 tax years will also be appropriate
for 2012. If this appeal results in the 66.66% discount rate being applied for 2010 and 2011, it
should also be applied in 2012, the last year of the assessment cycle. The Court will not be
deciding the 2012 ratio in a vacuum. It will simply be directing that the ratio found applicable
after extended litigation is to be applied for the last year of the five year appraisal cycle.
Respondent never addresses equitable jurisdiction or principles in its brief. The only case
cited by respondent in section "F." of its brief is Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721,100
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P.3d. 615, 2004.That case was a case at law which did not address directly equitable issues. The
Court did however clearly state at page 725 that the Court has recognized an exception "when
the ends of justice so require .... " This is such a case. Equity jurisdiction by its very name deals
with equity-that is justice. The equitable maxims developed over hundreds ofyears to guarantee
that the ends of justice are served. The two maxims cited at the top of page 34 of Appellants'
brief,- adjudication of all rights so as to avoid a multiplicity of suits, and not requiring the doing
of a useless thing apply here. If taxpayers prevail on the ratio issue, equitable principles and
Idaho law require that they get the relief for 2012 also.
Respondent made two arguments: This is a new issue raised for the first time on appeal; and
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Tax year 2012 valuation is new, but it is an issue
determined by the decision in this case which will have been fully briefed and argued. Initiating
another administrative appeal to decide the same issues now before this Court would be waste of
time and resources. The County Commissioners have already said the will await the result of the
appeal process. Equity should not follow rigid legal rules when application of such rules violates
long established equitable maxims which have not been challenged by Respondent.

G. (1) Even if Kootenai County prevails, it is not entitled to attorney fees
because Appellants did act with a reasonable basis in law and fact.
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The entire record in this case is replete with citations to statutes, cases, appraisal
authorities and arguments showing there are numerous issues of law and fact properly before this
Court. The respondent would not find it necessary to resort to the harmless error doctrine if there
were no reasonable basis in fact or law for Apellants' positions.
This Court has set an extremely high bar for parties seeking attorney fees under I.C, § 12117. Taylor v. Canyon County Board ofCommisioners,147 Idaho 424, 210 P.3d 532 (2009), was
a case in which the county sought attorney fees under the statute. At page 441 this Court wrote:
"We have previously found that the parties acted without a reasonable
basis in fact or law for purposes of awarding attorney fees under I. C. § 12117 when there was no statute authorizing judicial review, but have only
done so in cases where this Court was barred from reviewing all claims."
In this case, appellants clearly had a right to appeal to this Court and Taylor mandates that no
attorney fees be awarded.

CONCLUSION
The Idaho Supreme Court should hear this case and issue a decision explaining more
fully the application of Merris v. Ada County and Kimbrough v. Idaho Board ofTax Appeals to
real property valuation appeals. Appellant taxpayers have argued that the cases and the law are
clear. Merris establishes that conformance with Tax Commission mass appraisal standards is not
sufficient if the assessment does not reflect fair market value. I.C.§ 63-511 and I.C. § 63-3812
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clearly mandate that the burden of proof before the Board of Tax Appeals and the District Court
hearing appeals from either Board of Equalization or Board of Tax Appeals is a simple
preponderance of the evidence. Kimbrough doesn't change that rule or conflict with it. The
language in Kimbrough which seems to confuse the trial Court and Respondent deals with the
standard of Appellate Review- a court made rule- and not the burden of proof at the de novo
District Court hearing- a rule established by the legislature. Respondent and the trial court never
address taxpayer/appellants' arguments and citations to authority on these issues, apparently not
understanding them in spite of repeated efforts to focus on these issues. The meaning of these
cases and rules must be clarified by this Court so taxpayers get full and fair hearings of their
property tax appeals.
The Assessor presented evidence of compliance with mass appraisal standards and ratio
statistics showing such compliance. General statistical compliance proves nothing in an
individual instance. The Assessor's effort to use the "going out geographically' approach to find
comparable sales was fatally flawed methodology because it failed to make the required location
adjustments for differences in the markets. There was simply no credible, substantial evidence
of market value presented by the Assessor after Taxpayers presented a case based on opinions of
informed property owners and a licensed appraiser and repeated references to standard appraisal
texts, and authorities.
Respondent argues that Judge Kerrick "also found that the Petitioner did not shoulder his
burden under Idaho Code§ 63-Sll."(Resp Briefp.6) As argued above, the Judge's findings are
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not supported by the facts or law and are completely contaminated by his misreading of the
Kimbrough case. It is impossible to tell what he found from the decision he wrote. Had this
been a carefully constructed, meticulously crafted decision, maybe his language would have the
import Respondent tries to give it. The decision unfortunately is full of transpositions,
misapplication of statute and case law, inaccurate recitation of the record and a general failure to
understand or consider Appellants' arguments. There was no credible market value evidence
presented by the Assessor to counter or rebut Taxpayers' evidence of fair market value. The trial
court should be reversed and judgment entered for taxpayers settling values at one third the
buildable rate for tax years 201 0, 2011 and 2012, and awarding costs as specified at page 36 of
Appellants' brief.
No reconsideration at the trial level seems necessary. The assessor had ample notice of
Taxpayers' theories and contentions and chose not to present any credible evidence of market
value. If remand should be ordered, it should be directed to a new trial judge in order that
Appellants obtain a fair hearing before a Judge who will listen to their arguments.
Appellants should be the prevailing party and entitled recover their costs upon a timely
submission of the Memorandum of Costs.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 22d day ofFebruary, 2013

Sid Wurzburg
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I hereby certify that on the 22d day of February, 2013 I hand delivered two copies ofthis Reply
Brief to John Cafferty, attorney for Respondent, 451 N. Government Way, Coeur d'Alene,
Idaho, 83816.
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